Abstract. We consider the computational complexity of the market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the number of equilibrium prices is #P-hard.
Introduction
The mathematical proof of Arrow and Debreu on the existence of market equilibrium under general conditions [1] has provided economists with tools for rigorous studies of their subject matters. Scarf [16] designed the first algorithm and proved the convergence to one such equilibrium price in the limit. His algorithm showed the possibility that economic equilibrium states can indeed be evaluated. Subsequently, economists, mathematicians and operations researchers studied methods for computing market equilibria with many approaches such as closed form formulas, numerical methods, as well as mathematical programming solutions, for different models of exchange markets. In a recent work of Deng, Papadimitriou and Safra [7] , they explicitly called for an algorithmic complexity study of the problem, and developed interesting complexity results and approximation algorithms for several classes of utility functions. There has since been a surge of algorithmic study for the computation of the price equilibrium problem with continuous variables, discovering and re-discovering polynomial time algorithms for many classes of utility functions [9, 14, 8, 13, 11, 17, 2, 3] . However, as pointed out by Papadimitriou [15] , hardness computational results are difficult for the problem because of the guaranteed existence of equilibrium price for the continuous models under quite mild assumptions on utility functions. Indeed, the past known hardness results [7] are all for discrete models.
A recent surprising result by Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan and Ye [4] proved that computing a market equilibrium in a Leontief economy with certain properties is actually hard. In a Leontief economy, each agent demands a bundle of goods proportional to a constant vector
It was known that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the market equilibrium of Leontief economies in the Fisher setting [5] . The recent hardness results in [4] were developed through a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games and the market equilibria in the pairing model of Leontief economies. With that connection, hardness results in bi-matrix games [12] were carried over to the market equilibrium problem. Cases leading to NP-hardness include: (1) the uniqueness of the market equilibrium; (2) the existence of an equilibrium with positive prices on a given set of goods; (3) the existence of an equilibrium with at least (or at most) k goods positive priced (c.f. [4] ).
Our work tries to explore further the computational complexity issues of equilibrium prices, by fully exploring the clear structural properties of the Leontief economy. After introducing necessary definitions in Section 2, we focus on social welfare issues of the market equilibria in Section 3. We prove that it is NP-hard to compute the best/worst market equilibrium in Leontief economies, in terms of social utility, even when we are restricted to cases where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed. In Section 4, we prove the NP-hardness of maximizing individual utilities for the Leontief economy. The construction in the proof leads to an independent #P -hard proof of counting the number of equilibria in a Leontief economy 3 .
Exchange Market Equilibria and Utility Function Models
We consider an exchange market that consists of n divisible goods and m trading agents. Each trader comes to the market with an initial endowment of goods, denoted by a vector e i ∈ R n + for each trader i. The j-th entry of e i is the amount of good j taken by trader i. W.l.o.g., we assume that the total amount of each good is normalized to 1, i.e.,
Each trader has a utility function, representing its preference to different bundle of goods, which is denoted by u i (·) : R n + → R + for each trader i. At the market, the traders exchange their goods to maximized their utilities, according to the market price. They sell their initial endowments and buy their favorite goods. At a price p ∈ R n + , trader i solves the following optimization problem:
The market equilibrium is defined by the following requirement: Definition 1. An equilibrium in an exchange market is a price vectorp ∈ R n + and distributions of goods
and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
We will focus on a special type of utility functions called Leontief utility functions. 3 As pointed out by one of the reviewers, digging deep into the proof of the work of Codenotti, et al., [4] , one may notice that the one-to-one correspondence in their reduction would yield the #P-hardness of counting the number of equilibria in a Leontief economy, since counting the number of Nash equilibria in a bi-matrix game is known to be #P-hard. However, our hardness proofs are selfsustained and do not rely on the connection to the NP-hard problems in Nash equilibria.
Leontief Economy
A Leontief utility function u i can be characterized by a vector a i ∈ R n + . The trader's utility on a bundle of goods x i ∈ R n + is given by
In other words, a trader with a Leontief utility function demands a bundle of goods proportional to the vector a i . We can define a response function d i to present trader i's response with respect to a certain price p:
Therefore, given a price p,
can also be viewed as the trader i's optimal utility under the price p.
We adopt (A, E) to denote a Leontief economy, where A is an n × m matrix whose i-th column presents trader i's demands, and E is an n × m matrix whose i-th column is trader i's endowments.
With these notations, the equilibrium in a Leontief economy is a pair of vectors (p, w) satisfying the following conditions:
Hardness of Optimizing Social Welfare
We consider a social welfare function as a sum of individual utilities, i.e., m j=1 u j . Therefore, at an equilibrium (p, w) for a Leontief economy, the social welfare is m j=1 w j . The best market equilibrium (p * , w * ) for a Leontief economy satisfies:
Similarly, we can define the worst market equilibrium. We will show that it is NP-hard to find the best or worst market equilibrium in a Leontief economy, even if the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed.
The Pairing Model
In this section, our study focuses on a special pairing model introduced by Ye [18] . In the model, there is an equal number of traders and goods and trader i holds one unit of good i initially. The pairing model has been proven to be very useful in building the connection between Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games and market equilibria in Leontief economies [4] .
In the pairing model for a Leontief economy, the response function of trader i is simplified to:
Worst Social Welfare Equilibrium
We formulate the worst social welfare equilibrium as the following decision problem: 
Theorem 1. In a Leontief economy, it is NPhard to decide whether there exists a market equilibrium whose social welfare is less than an arbitrary number r, even if the existence of an equilibrium is already known.
Proof. Given a graph G = (V, E), we construct a 2n × 2n matrix
otherwise.
We claim that the graph G has a clique of size k if and only if there exists an equilibrium in the above Leontief economy, whose social welfare is no more than r = kn kn+1 . Split the vector w to w = (u T , v T ) T and let
For the sufficiency, let (p, w) be an equilibrium point satisfying that
We prove the existence of a k-clique in G = (V, E) by the following four steps:
By the complementary condition, there exists u i = 0. Hence,
If u i > 0, the complementary condition shows that:
The last two assertions prove that there must exist exactly k indices {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k } such that they are the only non-zero entries in w and
For any non-zero u i , the inequality 
Remark 1. The economy defined above always admits an equilibrium. Let u 1 = 1/k, v 1 = n − n/k − 1/k and any other components of w be zeros. Let p 1 = 1 and p n+1 = 1 − 1/k − 1/kn. It is easy to verify that (p, w) is an equilibrium.
Best Social Welfare Equilibrium
The above proof has prepared us with techniques for studying the more interesting maximization problem defined as follows. Proof. We carry out the proof by a reduction from CLIQUE. Given a graph G = (V, E) with n vertices and an integer k ≤ n, we can construct a matrix A using the construction in the proof of Theorem 1. Define an (2n + 2) × (2n + 2) matrix B as follows:
We claim that there is a k-clique in G if and only if there is an equilibrium (p, z) such that
For the sufficiency, assume that there exists an equilibrium (p, z) such that:
If w = 0, then S z ≤ 2 because x + 0.5y ≤ 1, a contradiction. Therefore, w = 0. Since Bz ≤ 1, we have S w ≤ 1 and x ≤ 1. If y = 0, S z = S w + x ≤ 2, a contradiction. Therefore, y > 0. By the complementary condition, x = 1 − 0.5y.
From Bz ≤ 1, we have S w + yε ≤ 1. Note that ε = 1 2(kn+1) , then
By the assertion in the proof of Theorem 1, there exists a k-clique in G.
Remark 2. The economy defined above always admits an equilibrium. The construction of the equilibrium is same to the one in Remark 1.
Hardness of Optimizing Individual Utility
In this section, we will show that it is NP-hard to find the equilibrium which maximizes a certain trader's utility, even if the existence of an equilibrium is already known. We also prove that counting the number of equilibria is #P -hard.
Min-Max of Individual Utilities and Counting the Number of Equilibria
Let φ be a Boolean formula in 3-conjunctive normal form. Let V = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } be its set of variables, L = l We will construct a Lenotief economy (A, E) for φ. Let B denote the set of traders and G denote the set of goods. 
0, otherwise.
In the economy (A, E), the total amount of good g is 1 (for g ∈ V ), 2 (for g ∈ L) or 5 (for g ∈ C).
Theorem 3. For a Leontief economy and an arbitrary number r, it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an equilibrium in which the maximal individual utility is less than r.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that φ is satisfiable if and only if there exists an equilibrium in the corresponding Leontief economy such that the maximal individual utility in the equilibrium is no more than 1.
For the necessity, assume there is a truth assignment (l 1 , ..., l n ) satisfies φ. Set P (g) = 1 for all g = l 
For the Leontief economy, the trader b's demand for good g is A(b, g)U (b) . Therefore,
is the total amount of money spent by trader b. The equilibrium conditions are:
For the first set of inequalities, we only need to consider those traders with endowment of nonzero value under the price vector P defined above. 
For the second set of inequalities, consider goods in V ∪ L:
For goods in C, one unit of g = c k is desired by each literal in c k that is true, two units of g = c k is desired by each literal in c k that is false. Since l i 's, i = 1, 2, ..., n, is a satisfying assignment, there is a true literal in each c k of three literals. Therefore, at most five units of g = c k are desired. With 5 units of each type of such goods, we have enough for them. is zero, and the prices of all c k 's are all zero, we have
For the sufficiency of the theorem, assume there is an equilibrium (P, U ) such that every trader's utility is no more than 1.
If P | V ∪L = 0, the value of the initial endowments of all traders in V ∪ L will be zero. Then the price of the goods in C will be zero too. It is a contradiction, so P | V ∪L = 0. Then the budget of every trader in V is positive. Since any trader x i ∈ V only wants the goods l and x i , the two units of goods l j i must be bought by them for the market clearance condition to hold as its price is non-zero. Therefore, U (l
Since the maximal utility of any trader is no more than 1, we must have U (l For any clause c k , assume w.o.l.g.
The above inequality corresponding to the clause c k forces that in the truth assignment of x i1 , x i2 and x i3 derived above, one of them will make the clause c k satisfied. Therefore the assignment derived from the market equilibrium makes φ satisfied.
Remark 3. The above economy always admits an equilibrium. Let P (g) = 1 for any g ∈ V ∪ L and P (g) = 0 for any g ∈ C. Then U (b) = 3/2 for any b ∈ V , U (b) = 1/2 for any b ∈ L and U (φ) = 0. It is easy to check that (P, U ) is an equilibrium.
An important property of the market (A, E) is that for any equilibrium (P, U ) and all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, either U (x i ) ≥ 3/2, or U (x i ) = U (l 
Maximizing Individual Utility
With techniques similar to those used in § 4.1, we can show the NP-hardness of maximizing individual utility.
Theorem 4. For a trader in a Leontief economy and an arbitrary number r, it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an equilibrium in which his utility is greater than r.
Proof. We extend the economy M = (A, E) in the previous subsection. Add n goods Θ = {θ 1 , ..., θ n } and a trader ψ to the market. We define A and E as follows: 
Conclusions
In this work, we proved that computing an equilibrium with optimal social/individual welfare in Leontief economies is NP-hard. In comparison, a major result of Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan and Ye [4] states that finding the equilibrium price is NP-hard. However, the economy they defined may not have an equilibrium price at all. The ultimate question remains open: what is the computational complexity for finding an equilibrium price, given that the economy admits one.
In addition, we developed a #P-hard proof for counting the number of equilibrium prices. Our #P-hard proof does not depend on the connection between market equilibria and Nash equilibria established by Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan and Ye [4] . The understanding of structural properties of the Leontief economy is indeed very important in all the hardness proofs. We expect they would be helpful in further deepening our understanding of computational complexity of market equilibria.
